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On August5, 2010 Kenyans adopted a new constitution by the approval of almost 
70% of voters. This was the culmination of almost two decades of mainly non-
violent struggle for constitutional reform. Kenya’s previous constitution was 
anomalous from a structural violence perspective.
1
 Johan Galtung defines struc-
tural violence as existing in those conditions in which human beings are influ-
enced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential 
realizations. Kenya is not currently in a state of war but it could also be argued 
that neither does peace prevail. A central theme of this essay is that peace is more 
than simply the absence of war. Kenya’s previous constitution had ceased to meet 
the needs and expectations of Kenyan society and therefore became a major 
source of structural conflict.
2
A central theme throughout this essay is therefore 
that it is the constitutional conflicts that have given rise to the need to overhaul 
the current constitution, although whether such an overhaul is necessary is itself 
sometimes debated.Whereas constitutional issues have been widely analyzed from 
other perspectives, such as legal and political-science perspectives, there is a 
dearth of literature on constitutional reform issues that adopts a conflict-theory 
perspective.This essay applies the tools of conflict theory to shed light on the 
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process of Kenyan constitutional conflicts.However, in the application of analyti-
cal tools in conflict, fundamental epistemological issues are also 
raised.Constitutional reform is ultimately about a fundamental paradigm shift.
3
A 
constitution can be viewed as a paradigm that defines the way relationships in 
society are organized. An existing constitutional paradigm is acceptable as long as 
it adequately reflects the aspirations and expectations of a given society.However, 
social dynamism implies that constitutions will over time begin to develop 
significant anomalies, thereby making an existing constitutional paradigm inade-
quate and obsolete.This essay is therefore to some extent concernedwith the 
epistemology of constitutional conflicts.Other fundamental epistemological 
debates, such as whether conflict is subjective or objective, also inform this essay. 
The rationale behind adopting a conflict perspective in this essay is that 
conflict is ultimately about incompatibilities of goals.
4
The incompatibility of 
goals is fundamental to the existence of conflict situations, whether one is dealing 
with structural or behavioral conflict.The more valuable the objectives being 
sought, the more intense is the conflict.The central constitutional conflicts Kenya 
has experienced for the last two decades are fundamentally about incompatibili-
ties of goals among different actors involved in the constitutional review pro-
cess.These conflicts have often been particularly intense, albeit mainly at a 
structural level because of the value of the objectives involved.A fundamental 
objective of value, which for a long time intensified constitutional conflicts in 
Kenya, has been the distribution of power, particularly executive power, implied 
by alternative constitutional arrangements. The constitution has often been seen as 
a power map whereby the constitutional order became not an arbiter in the power 
process, but a fundamental element in political warfare.
5
 These constitutional 
conflicts have continued even after the adoption in 2010 of a new constitution. 
Recent constitutional conflicts in Kenya have focused on the implementation of 
the new constitutional order. Advocates of deep-rooted change have resisted the 
implementation of the new constitutional order or have sought to dilute some of 
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its provisions at the implementation stage to retain the status quo. 
Conflict is an intrinsic and inevitable component of social change.
6
Con-
flict is an expression of a diversity of interests, values and beliefs that emerge as 
new structures generated by social change come up against established con-
straints.This implies that Kenya’s constitutional conflicts are part of its social 
change process and indeed should be seen in this context.These conflicts on a 
very fundamental level represent the challenge posed by a new constitutional 
dispensation to the existing social structures whereby elites with vested interests 
seek to preserve the status quo. The reward structure in such societies is a built-in 
transfer of value from underdog to the topdog, where the latter inevitably gets 
more than his due through a process of accumulation.
7
 When an existing structure 
is threatened, those who benefit from the accompanying structural violence 
particularly a country’s elite will try to preserve the status quo which serves their 
interests.
8
The challenge to the status quo posed by deep-rooted constitutional 
reform and the attendant resistance to reform attempts by Kenya’s political elite is 
a fundamental theme of constitutional conflicts in Kenya, even after the adoption 
of a new constitutional order in 2010. 
This essay proceeds by developing the philosophical basis for the notion 
that peace is more than the absence of war. This is a central theme of the paper, 
since Kenya is currently not in a state of war; but it is vital to consider whether 
this implies that Kenya is at peace. It then considers the subjective/objective 
debate, which analyzes whether a conflict needs to be perceived in order for it to 
exist. This debate is central to understanding the idea that peace is more than the 
absence of war. The fundamental theme of the paper, which is the philosophy of 
non-violence, is then analyzed. The application of non-violence in addressing 
Kenya’s constitutional conflicts over the last two decades is then considered. The 
vital linkages that occur between non-violence and direct violence are then 
critically appraised. The essay concludes by briefly considering some case studies 
from other African countries, so as to provide an assessment of non-violence as a 
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means of achieving needed social change. 
 
Peace as More than the Absence of War 
A vital philosophical question is whether peace is simply the absence of 
war.Adam Curle
9
develops the idea of structural violence by challenging the 
traditional dichotomy between war and peace. In the classical discourses there 
was a situation of either war or peace. It was not possible to have both simultane-
ously. Curle, however, argues that it is possible to have a condition in between the 
classical notions of war and peace which is characterized as “unpeaceful.” The 
absence of peace is characteristic of many situations where there is no overt 
conflict. In unpeaceful situations, human beings are impeded from achieving full 
development, either because of their own internal relations or because of the types 
of relationships that exist between themselves and other persons or groups. Curle 
provides the prototypical unpeaceful relationship as that of a master and a slave.
10
 
The slave is unaware of the enormity of his position and of the fact that it could 
ever be changed, and so apathetically accepts it. In other words, the slave is 
objectively in a situation of conflict which he does not realize. However, polariza-
tion of the conflict changes this structure so that the formerly happy slave eventu-
ally subjectively realizes that he is in a situation of conflict. Curle argues that this 
can occur through the role of a third party who can do something about the happy 
slave situation by polarizing the conflict so that the slave realizes what kind of 
condition he is living in. This implies some growth of awareness in his position as 
a slave through the empowerment by a third party. Once the slave is aware, he 
struggles to reach a position of equality with his master, so that their relationship 
can be reordered in accordance with principles of justice. This, according to 
Curle, represents the stage of confrontation. Kenyan society conforms to Curle’s 
conceptualization of an unpeaceful society in that there are relatively few instanc-
es of overt conflict and yet the relations in society are structured in such a way 
that many Kenyans are impeded from achieving their full development. The 
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constitutional setup in Kenya has been a fundamental contributory factor to this 
situation. This is fundamentally because the previous constitution had ceased to 
meet the needs and expectations of Kenyan society.
11
 Constitutional conflicts 
arose prior to 2010 on the basis that the Kenyan constitution did not tackle many 
fundamental concerns of its citizens, such as equitable resource distribution, the 
delivery of justice, and the recognition and protection of individual and minority 
rights.
12
 In this situation incompatibilities of goals in turn developed, which are 
essence of conflict. This situation still to some extent persists, even after the 
adoption of the new constitution in 2010, since the implementation of the new 
constitution requires subsidiary legislation which has been the subject of consid-
erable debate. Provisions in the new constitution on devolution, for example, 
require the setting up of a new country-based administration and the development 
of appropriate revenue-sharing mechanisms. The details of exactly how the new 
counties will function are still largely unresolved. In addition, the new constitu-
tion did not adequately address all of the issues that had given rise to the push for 
constitutional reform. The new constitution in practice still provides for a relative-
ly high degree of central control,even though decentralization was one of the key 
themes of the constitutional reform agenda prior to 2010. 
 
The Subjective/Objective Debate in Conflict 
Curle
13
 introduces an interesting theoretical dimension in respect of the degree of 
perception or awareness of the conflict. He argues that in many unpeaceful 
relationships the parties are perfectly aware of the discordance of their aims. In 
others, however, the conflict is not clearly recognized. Curle distinguishes be-
tween various types of unpeaceful relationships on the basis of whether the power 
relations are balanced or asymmetrical and whether there is considerable aware-
ness of the conflict. He argues that in situations where conflict is absent because 
of low awareness, there is at least latent or potential conflict. Individuals in such a 
society may be politically unaware, but this does not imply that they are hap-
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py;they normally live in circumstances conducive to misery. 
This leads to a fundamental epistemological debate in conflict theory, 
which revolves around the question of whether for a conflict to exist it has to be 
perceived by the participants in the situation.
14
 If one holds an objectivist view of 
conflict, conflict need not be felt for it to exist. Conflict is, therefore, not depend-
ent on subjective perceptions and can be perceived by third parties, even if it is 
not perceived by the actors. This is the standpoint of the peace researcher who 
argues that the victims of adverse structures may not be unhappy with their lot 
and may then be considered as “happy slaves.”
15
 Conflict emerges from a clash of 
real interests, rather than a perceived clash of interests, although actors may not 
perceive who their real enemies are. This implies that if in a particular social 
system one group gains what the other loses, structural conflict exists even if the 
loser does not understand what is happening. However, in order to define a 
situation as conflictual, dimensions of social existence have to be emphasized 
which are considered as vital to the observer. This implies that even the objectivist 
perceives social reality through the lens of his or her own values. If the values of 
the observer were different, this would in turn affect the perception of the conflict. 
This explains why in Kenya some individuals recommended an overhaul of the 
constitution during the constitutional reform process, whereas others considered it 
to be fundamentally sound and only needing piecemeal changes. These individu-
als clearly had different values and hence perceived the constitutional conflict 
situation in Kenya differently. A key challenge relating to constitutional imple-
mentation even in the post-2010 era is the lack of a concept of the common good 
among Kenya’s leaders. Kenya’s leadership since independence has been largely 
self-serving. Many politicians in Kenya enter politics not to serve the people but 
to seek rewards and privileges for themselves. The majority have a vested interest 
in maintaining the present governmental system, which provides opportunities for 
corruption, high salaries, and preferential treatment.
16
 Many of these politicians 
have therefore opposed the full implementation of the 2010 constitutional dispen-
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sation, especially in areas that aim to reduce their privileges. Thus constitutional 
conflicts in Kenya did not end with the adoption of a new constitution in August 
2010, as many implementation challenges have remained. The new constitution, 
for example, provides that those vying for public office should have high stand-
ards of integrity. This provision has been difficult to implement and has been 
undermined by some political leaders. 
According to the subjective view, for a conflict to exist there has to be at 
least some perception of the incompatible goals by the social actors. For subjec-
tivists, therefore, if people cannot subjectively perceive a conflict and its effects, 
they are not in a situation of conflict.
17
 This is the position of the conflict re-
searcher who considers conflicts as subjective. This is because the parties can 




In the Kenyan situation, there exist individuals who are politically una-
ware; but it is clear that they are confronted with the consequences of the deeply 
embedded structural conflict. A number of Kenyans are, however, clearly aware 
of the structural conflict situation in which they live. The evidence for this asser-
tion is the increasing role that members of the public play in criticizing the 
conduct of the government. Their participation in debates in the media also shows 
some awareness of the conflict issues they face. It will be argued that it is not 
necessary for all Kenyans be aware that they are in a conflict situation in order for 
that conflict to exist. Civil society and the media have a very important role in 
increasing the general awareness of Kenyans about the anomalous state of the 
constitution. 
The distinction between objectivists and subjectivists is important, be-
cause it has extremely important implications for conflict management.
19
Since the 
subjective viewpoint considers that for conflict to exist the parties to a conflict 
must experience it, conflict management must focus on the efforts and inputs of 
the parties themselves.On the other hand, objectivists hold that people can be in a 
8 War and Peace in Africa 
conflict without realizing it and as such third parties can enter into a conflict and 
play a role in its management.Objectivists focus on changing the conflict generat-
ing structure. Curle
20
, for example, considers it essential for relationships to 
undergo radical change if they are to be made peaceful.In the case of all revolu-
tions, there musthave been, at some stage, a movement from a lower to a higher 
awareness of the situation.In the case of deeply embedded constitutional conflicts, 
a complete overhaul of the constitution is necessary in order to change the conflict 
generating structure. Those who favored this approach during the constitutional 
reform process argued that the previous constitution was fundamentally 
flawed.Given that structural conflict in Kenya to a considerable extent arose from 
the non-representative and non-inclusive nature of the negotiations that led to the 
birth of the previous constitution, it was argued that what was required was a 
fundamental overhaul of the entire constitution on the basis of a widespread 
participation of the citizens in the process.
21
 This was aimed at removing the 
conflict-generating constitutional structure in Kenyan society. A re-writing of the 
constitution and not amendments of the existing one were required, because many 
constitutional amendments that have been made since 1963 have destroyed the 
principle of constitutionalism in terms of the necessary checks and balances that a 
limited government needs.
22
 Since 2010, constitutional amendments have also 
been used by politicians to attempt to frustrate the goals of the new constitution. 
An alternative approach to constitutional reform recommended piecemeal 
constitutional change aimed at dealing with the most overt defects in the constitu-
tion. Those opposed to fundamental reform wanted a constitutional repair job.
23
 
This approach was based on the assumption that the previous Constitution of 
Kenya was basically sound and the solution was therefore to fix those parts of the 
constitution that were causally related to the constitutional conflicts. Ultimately, 
the new constitution adopted in 2010 could be considered to have been informed 
primarily by the overhaul approach. The new constitution aims at equal rights for 
all Kenyans and aspires to a situation where every Kenyan has the basic necessi-
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ties of life. It attempts to make government more accountable to the people. A key 
challenge in achieving these lofty ideals is, however, attempting to change the 
deep-rooted political culture in Kenya that is still fundamentally lacking in a 
vision of the common good. 
 
The Philosophy of Non-Violence 
The issue of whether situations of structural violence are best addressed by 
violently overthrowing the existing structure or by non-violence can be critically 
assessed. There is a school of thought which advocates non-violence as the best 
way even to change situations of structural violence. Non-violence in a generic 
sense refers to abstention from physical force against human beings.
24
 Violence is 
not the only way to bring about dramatic social change and eliminate unjust 
relationships in society.
25
 A vital goal of non-violent action is the preservation of 
human life. Non-violence literally implies restraining from taking up arms or 
killing or wounding people. Non-violence may be described as insistence on the 
freedom of conscience and the struggle to find a correct relationship with an 
established authority. Given that freedom is never voluntarily given by the op-
pressor, it must be demanded by the oppressed. Such freedom is adopted as a 
moral force in a revolutionary non-violent struggle in the quest for a just social 
order. Non-violent action is based on translating courage, dignity and assertive-
ness into an effective form of struggle. Although non-violent struggle is non-
military, it is revolutionary in its comprehensiveness of the changes sought. The 
democratic impulses in the use of popular non-violent power are part of the 
process of social transformation. It is argued by advocates of non-violence that 
violent action by one party to a conflict does not justify retaliation in terms of 
violence. The objective of non-violent struggle is not victory over the other side 
but mutual gain through realizing an intrinsically good end. Indeed, the non-
violent resister does not seek to defeat the opponent but to win his friendship and 
understanding.
26
 The aftermath of non-violence is reconciliation. The non-violent 
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resister seeks to attack the evil system rather than the individuals who happen to 
be caught up in the system. It is a means of awakening a sense of shame within 
the oppressor but the end is reconciliation. It can be considered as struggle 
between justice and injustice. Non-violence rejects a completely deterministic 
outlook by focusing on the power of the individual to bring about change.
27
 
Non-violence can be understood as a basis for social organization based on 
the principle that the organization of violence is itself undemocratic and inegali-
tarian. It recognizes that the removal of an elite by assassination or other violent 
means does not guarantee a real change of structure. Indeed, some violent revolu-
tions, such as the French and Russian Revolutions, demonstrated that an attempt 
at violent social change may sometimes bring about more violence and human 
misery. In the African context, many violent revolutions, such as the one that 
overthrew President Mobutu in the former Zaire, only bred more violence, largely 
because the underlying social structures remained unchanged. Non-violent 
approaches argue that the overt violence of physical conflict does not constitute 
an effective tool for change, since the means and the end should be consistent and 
wrongful means cannot be used to secure a just end. In addition, mass violence 
has heavy human costs and dehumanizes and brutalizes both the victim and the 
executioner. Proponents of non-violence argue that the probability of reaching an 
agreement with an opponent is much higher when non-violence rather than 
violence is used. 
Non-violence as a strategy for change was fully developed by Mahatma 
Gandhi in his campaign to secure independence from Britain between the 1920s 
and 1940s. Gandhi’s non-violent principle was known as Satyagraha and consti-
tuted a means for converting the power in non-violence into political action.
28
 
Gandhi applied the non-violent strategy by attracting a large number of people to 
a commitment of non-cooperation and civil disobedience, as demonstrated by his 
protest against the Salt Acts, which required the purchase of salt only from the 
British government. Gandhi held on to the tenet of non-violence no matter what 
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the circumstances.
29
 He had also earlier applied Satyagraha in South Africa as 
part of the struggle of the Indians against discrimination and repression by the 
White community in South Africa.
30
 He therefore recommended non-violent 
resistance, even in situations where it appeared unviable. A fundamental element 
in this strategy was the belief that the opponent would be moved to improve when 
confronted with the power of truth and love. When in a non-violent campaign 
discipline is maintained despite repression or more suffering is taken on oneself 
than the pain imposed by the opponent, it throws the adversary off balance.
31
 The 
sight of unarmed resistance in the face of superior or military force may cause 
many in the general population to lose faith in those giving orders to repress the 
non-violent group. The opponent may lose the support of its police or soldiers. 
 
The Application of Non-Violence in the Context of Kenya’s Constitu-
tional Conflicts 
The principle of non-violence has been applied to some extent in the context of 
the Kenyan constitutional reform process, where civil society organizations have 
called for mass action accompanied by civil disobedience, while specifically 
discouraging violence. Thus, for example, mass action began in Kenya on May 3, 
1997 and ended on October 20, 1997.
32
 This mass action took forms such as 
rallies, demonstrations, processions, strikes, sit-ins, vigils and prayers. Mass 
action challenged the legitimacy of the existing legal order by attempting to use 
non-violent means of protest. Mass action in this sense was used as an alternative 
to armed struggle. However, even this mass action has its negative consequences, 
resulting in some deaths at the hands of police and also some individuals engag-
ing in looting. The Likoni-Kwale violence in that year was a desperate way for the 
regime to deal with the reform movement and mass action. Private armies and 
militia groups such as Jeshi la Mzee were set up by theKenya African National 
Union(KANU) regime to intimidate the reformists and some of the reformists 
were subjected to repression and torture. However, it helped to build a culture of 
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resistance to an illegitimate authority by the Kenyan people. This mass action 
created a crisis for the KANU regime and immediately after Saba Saba in 1997 
President Moi summoned religious leaders and asked them to mediate between 
KANU and the National ConventionExecutive Council (NCEC). The Kenyan 
case, however, demonstrates that even mass action based on a non-violent ideolo-
gy is still likely to result in casualties of violence, as an oppressive regime strug-
gles to maintain its grip on power. Mass action was a means used to attempt to 
pressure the regime of President Kibaki to undertake constitutional reforms. 
Despite the fact that the Kibaki regime undertook to have a new constitution 
within one hundred days, a new constitution was only adopted eight years later, in 
2010. The failure to enact a new constitution became a key electoral issue in 
2007. Elections can also be considered as a non-violent means of achieving 
needed social change. The extent of implementation of the 2010 constitution in 
Kenya was a critical electoral issue in the March 2013 elections. 
 
The Linkages between Structural Violence and Direct Violence in 
Kenya’s Constitutional Conflicts 
This essay argues that there is an important interrelationship between structural 
and direct violence. Prolonged exploitative conditions eventually produce violent 
resistance.
33
 Coercive mechanisms are often used to force people to accept unjust 
conditions or economic inequality. On several occasions, the reluctance of the 
government to address the issues raised in the constitutional conflicts contributed 
to direct violence aimed at exerting pressure on the ruling elite to make conces-
sions with regard to the constitutional review process. For example, in 1997 the 
NCEC agitated for a new constitution before the 1997 general election and, owing 
to resistance from the KANU government, the streets of Nairobi turned into 
battlegrounds between the Government and the reformers. The country witnessed 
violence and deaths on July 7th (SabaSaba) and August 8th (Nane Nane) and was 
gearing up for October 10th (Kumi Kumi). President Moi had ruled out any 
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reforms before the 1997 elections, while the opposition had also taken a hardline 
stance, vowing to ensure that the country would not go to the polls unless the 
constitution was changed. In the Kenyan context, mass action advocating consti-
tutional reforms has often contributed to direct violence or the threat of it. This 
threat of widespread direct violence has often been used to pressurize incumbent 
governments since the early 1990s to undertake reforms. It could also be argued 
that a root cause of the post-election violence in Kenya in 2008 was the anoma-
lous constitutional order that was in place at the time. This constitutional order, by 
virtue of the considerable power that it gave to the executive, contributed to 
making the election a very high stakes game in which competing political parties 
were willing to use any means, including violent ones, to ensure their desired 
political outcomes. The Kenyan case illustrates the principle that prolonged and 
deep-seated structural violence eventually gives rise to direct violence. 
 
An Assessment of Non-Violence as a Philosophy for Achieving Social 
Change 
However, reform movements inspired by fundamentally non-violent ideologies 
are arguably preferable to violent ones that seek to overthrow an existing struc-
ture. In the Kenyan context, the application of non-violence succeeded in starting 
the process of constitutional reform process. Some progress was also made by the 
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission in collecting and analyzing views 
from Kenyans on the preferred direction of constitutional change. The review 
process in Kenya often stagnated over the two decades of agitation for constitu-
tional reform. At such times non-violent means, especially mass action and 
elections, were used to jumpstart the constitutional review process, eventually 
culminating in the adoption of a new constitution in August 2010. There is no 
guarantee that even violent revolutionary movements will necessarily bring 
fundamental change or whether they will merely seek to maintain the status quo 
to their own advantage once they are in power. This latter phenomenon has been 
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illustrated by number of recent cases of violent revolution in Africa. For example, 
in 1980 Samuel Doe violently overthrew William Tolbert’s regime in Liberia, 
promising to liberate the masses from corruption and oppression; yet he continued 
to rule by decree for more than ten years, without bringing any fundamental 
change to Liberia.
34
Charles Taylor later violently overthrew Doe’s regime on the 
pretext of bringing revolutionary change; but he later continued to rule by repres-
sion and even contributed to the outbreak of violence in neighboring Sierra 
Leone.In Nigeria, General Sani Abacha overthrew the incumbent regime, promis-
ing change, but later instituted one of the most repressive regimes in Nigerian 
history.In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the army of Laurent Kabila, sup-
ported by Rwanda and Uganda, overthrew the Mobutu regime in 1997; but he 
turned out to have no political vision or strategy and refused to engage with 
established opposition groups or civil organizations.While Mobutu had in the past 
packed his administration with supporters from his home province of Equateur, 
Kabila also pursued a similar policy of handing out key government positions to 
members of his Lubakat tribe of Northern Katanga.On the other hand, a more 
reconciliatory strategy of non-violence pursued by leaders such as Nelson Man-
dela in Southern Africa in the 1990s was more effective in producing relatively 
deep-rooted change. The eventual triumph of the non-violence movement in 
Kenya in contributing to the adoption of a new constitution in 2010 also strength-
ens the case for the use of non-violence in achieving social change. Whether the 
philosophy of non-violence succeeds in achieving a full implementation of the 
constitution adopted in 2010 remains to be seen. 
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